Using data from policy analyses, media analyses and a European-wide survey about public perceptions of biotechnology conducted in 1996 and again in 1999, it is shown how a country's public develops an everyday understanding of a new technology (genetic modi cation) construed as potentially harmful by the media. To understand the reliance on images and related beliefs, we propose a theory of collective symbolic coping. It identi es four steps: rst, the creation of awareness; second, production of divergent images; third, convergence upon a couple of dominant images in the public sphere; fourth, normalization. It is suggested that symbolic coping occurs in countries where a recent increase in policy activity and of media reporting has alerted the public; that this public show a high proportion of beliefs in menacing images; that these beliefs are relatively independent of pre-existing popular science knowledge; and that they are functionally equivalent to scienti c knowledge in providing judgmental con dence and reducing self-ascribed ignorance. These propositions are shown to be true in Austria and Greece. Several implications of the theory are discussed, including social representation theory and public understanding of science.
In a cross-national study on the perception of genetically modified organisms in Europe, it was found that in some countries, menacing images of genetically modified organisms play a significant role in understandings of biotechnology. Even though more scientifically literate people might read the relevant columns in newspapers or consult professional literature on the topic in order to attain a more accurate understanding by scientific standards, the majority of people do not possess the necessary educational resources or the time necessary for such research. We suggest that the general public adopt images or representations that are the product of a collective process of 'symbolic coping' with new phenomena and a natural component of everyday thinking and common sense. The process by which individuals come to render new technologies or scientific achievements intelligible is driven by inter-individual and mass-media communication, and results in milieu-specific imaginations that then allow an acceptable level of understanding. Some aspects of the notion of symbolic coping introduced in this paper bear upon the social representation approach (see Moscovici, 1988; Wagner et al., 1999) , but it will be argued that the theory of symbolic primacy over individual sense-making. The public sphere is a sphere of symbolic circulation; it can be understood as the cooking pot from which symbolic innovation emerges (Jovchelovitch, 1995) .
We define symbolic coping as the activity of a collectivity that attempts to maintain the integrity of its worldview by making sense of any new phenomenon. It comprises several conditions and stages: first, for symbolic coping to occur, the new phenomenon must be communicated as being relevant and as challenging the taken-for-granted or desirable way of life; second, to accommodate the new phenomenon within the existing repertoires of social knowledge, various interpretations, images and metaphors emerge in media and conversations which render it intelligible; third, the various interpretations tend to converge towards one or a few fairly widespread interpretations that define some essential attributes; fourth, the interpretations may consolidate or give way to a more scientifically accurate understanding in the long run. This process can be called 'normalization'. These points are discussed further below.
Awareness
A public's awareness of a phenomenon is created by a claim for social relevance. A phenomenon is relevant if one or more of the assumptions and implications that appear in discourse are perceived as relevant by a significant proportion of the public (see Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 152) . Most of the time, it is political controversy being spread and amplified by the mass media that creates awareness in a process known as agenda setting. Some of the media's agendas become public agendas because of their relevance for a specific social sector or milieu (McCombs, 1981) .
In the case of genetic engineering, a technology was construed and communicated as unfamiliar, with unknown procedures and consequences, and expected to penetrate everyday life. It was claimed that crops with hitherto unknown properties were to be grown that would then be found as novel foods on supermarket shelves. Claims raised by NGOs and discussed by policy-makers and certain media were taken up and found relevant enough to be perceived as a potential threat by many people. The claims and predictions circulating in public communication established a link between the new technology and the people's proximal life space, such as diet and health. As a result, biotechnology was then identified as a highly relevant technological development by the average citizen. Once awareness of the claim of relevance were construed, they acted as the driving force for the collectivity to engage in the project of symbolic coping with the challenge.
Claims of future hazards and risks in a world where technological progress is by and large understood to provide less risk and more security are likely to capture the people's imagination and instigate communication. This situation resembles Ruscher and Hammer's (1994) observation that disrupting impressions of a third person or object in a dyad stimulates conversation about that object. Through conversation, individuals as well as dyads revise their memories and shared impressions in the light of the new and disrupting information (Burger & Palmer, 1992) . On a collective level, the equivalent to conversation is extended public discourse, political controversy and media reporting, which introduces and tests novel and divergent images and other interpretive devices.
People are motivated to develop ideas about novelties not because of their unfamiliarity, but because they are required to hold opinions in conversations and to take sides in political debates spread via the media. Showing ignorance in a debate is embarrassing for most people (Guerin, 2001) .
Divergence
By definition, novelty transcends existing knowledge to some degree. Depending on the degree of novelty, attempts to understand the novel in terms of the existing repertoire of interpretations may fail. Then a new interpretation is called for. At least at the beginning, a new interpretation will be metaphorically linked to pre-existing knowledge, which serves as a source domain (Lakoff, 1987; Wagner, Elejabarrieta, & Lahnsteiner, 1995) . It can also refer to available image schemata that capture aspects that escape propositional representation (Johnson, 1987) . Since there is a boundless diversity of potentially useful source domains in language, the manifold of images and metaphors used by the public, will diverge at the beginning. This set of alternatives is, however, not arbitrary, but is limited by the frame of a common culture (Bangerter, 2000; Bartlett, 1932; Kashima, 2000) .
Convergence
Ongoing media and personal communication places divergent interpretations in competition with each other. Some are eliminated, and others are embraced by a majority of people (Sperber, 1985) , and the group attains a new conventionalized interpretation (see Bartlett, 1932) . It has a structure that captures the complex of ideas in an image-like schema and weaves it into the fabric of the group's common-sense (Krauss & Fussel, 1991; Moscovici, 1988) . This may take the form of metaphor, image, interrelated beliefs or of any other symbolic representation that can serve as an interpretation of the new. Which image is accepted in a group is a problem neither of 'scientific truth' nor of arbitrary choice, but rather is determined by a group's world of experience. That is, the resulting image or metaphor does not need to be 'correct' or 'accurate', but plausible.
There are two relevant characteristics of such interpretations. First, they fulfil similar functions as do other forms of knowledge. Like technical, scientific and school knowledge, symbolic coping by way of images reduces ambivalence and provides confidence in judgments about the world. Both are forms of knowledge that are equivalent in terms of replacing ignorance.
Second, images and metaphors occupy their own semantic space, which may be logically independent from other forms of knowledge. They are not required to be consistent with other knowledge items (e.g. Billig et al., 1988 , for the ideological realm). Contradictions of this kind are usually not discomforting as long as any two contradictory items are not simultaneously evoked, and as long as local consistency is preserved (Wagner, 1994, p. 116) . If a set of beliefs, which is simultaneously relevant to a circumscribed context, is consistent irrespective of whether it contradicts beliefs referring to other realms, it is defined as locally consistent. McGuire's (1960) 'Socratic effect' is a case in point. It illustrates that people asked to discuss their beliefs and knowledge about separate realms in an experiment exhibit more consistency after, rather than before, the discussion.
Normalization
Symbolic coping is an emergency response to what a collectivity perceives and construes as a challenge to their established way of life. Images created by a group in a period of 'emergency coping' do not need to remain stable and dominant for a long period. They may fade if the topic is taken off the agenda, or, in the case of persistent interest, they may succumb to the less emotional and more sober styles of policymaking and media-reporting that characterizes temporally extended and 'normalized' media discourse. Biotechnology is certainly not a topic that is expected to become less important in the near future, but after the first years of hype, the media are likely to promote more so-called scientific facts and knowledge, which would help update the public's school knowledge. Normalization in a scientific and technological matter implies a decreasing prominence of fantasy-filled and menacing images. Normalization, however, is not irreversible should political controversy arise again.
1
The study: Symbolic coping with biotechnology in Austria and Greece
Biotechnology was introduced and communicated in European countries at different rates during the last decade and was accompanied by country-specific social and political processes. There are countries, such as the UK, where genetically engineered food has been readily available in supermarkets for many years, and where political actors have dealt with some issues of health and safety regulation. In addition, the media have maintained an ongoing discourse about this topic over the past decade. There are other countries, such as Austria, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, where genetic engineering was rarely, if at all, a political and media issue before the second half of the 1990s. Two countries where the biotechnology agenda was delayed will be used to illustrate collective symbolic coping: Austria and Greece.
The public perception of biotechnology in Europe was assessed in two Eurobarometer surveys, one during November 1996 and the second in 1999. The fortuitous timing of these two surveys allowed us to examine the Austrian and Greek public responses at times of intense political controversy, where symbolic coping processes could be expected, and to compare their data with other European countries where biotechnology has been a long-standing public agenda.
This study deals with real life social processes at a high aggregation level. We are analysing a natural experiment on a large scale, which cannot be reproduced under exactly the same conditions, which cannot be transferred to a laboratory setting, and where randomization is impossible. Accordingly, we interpret the study as an illustration and exploration of the theory of collective symbolic coping, not as a test.
We maintain that everyday thinking about biotechnology relies heavily on images. In a questionnaire, such images are expressed in the form of propositional beliefs. In the following, we refer to beliefs related to an image as 'image-beliefs'.
The following effects are proposed and illustrated through research.
Proposition 1
An increase in media reporting and policy activities signals the emerging importance of biotechnology in a country and creates awareness of the dangers and risks. In such a situation, the public comes under pressure to cope symbolically with the novelty in terms of developing interpretive images. The coping response should demonstrate a higher percentage of fantasy-filled and menacing image-beliefs than in countries that are in a pre-or post-coping state.
Proposition 2
Everyday understanding of a technological innovation is expected to be locally consistent; that is, it should be relatively independent of the general public's formal knowledge acquired in school and other education. A new technology is likely to involve scientific insights that did not exist at the time when people received formal education, and any contradictions between images and pre-existing knowledge can then be tolerated as long as they are not discussed in the same context. As a result, a country's public who is in the state of coping are likely to hold image-beliefs irrespective of their level of school and textbook knowledge.
Proposition 3
Obtaining an understanding, whether imaginary or scientific, goes hand in hand with confidence, which, in turn, reduces self-ascribed ignorance. In questionnaires, self-ascribed ignorance is expressed as a 'don't know' response. Consequently, respondents from countries engaged in symbolic coping as well as from countries defined as in a 'post-coping' phase should produce fewer 'don't know' responses for image-beliefs compared with respondents from countries defined as being in a 'pre-coping' stage.
Proposition 4
Time and the normalizing style of media discourse will make an initially dominant image lose its prevalence and become less frequent. After the stage of coping, a public should show a similar pattern of image-beliefs as other post-coping countries; as a result, there should be fewer image-beliefs and relatively more scientifically correct responses.
Method

Survey sample
Two Eurobarometer surveys were conducted in November 1996 and in November 1999. Both comprised representative random samples of approximately 1000 respondents in each of the 15 member countries of the European Union. The survey was conducted by professional survey contractors according to standard survey procedures. The sampling resulted in a total of 16,246 responses.
Survey material
Survey 1996
The questionnaire contained a series of items concerning knowledge and image-related beliefs about biology and biotechnology.
(1) Six items were composed of a scale of textbook knowledge regarding general biological facts. By textbook knowledge, we mean the kind of knowledge that is normally acquired through formal education at school or in later adult life. The answers to these questions can be found in appropriate textbooks: 1(a) There are bacteria which live in waste water. 1(b) The cloning of living things produces exactly identical offspring. 1(c) Viruses can be contaminated by bacteria. 1(d) Yeast for brewing beer consists of living organisms. 1(e) It is possible to find out in the first few months of pregnancy whether a child will have Down's Syndrome. 1(f) More than half of the human genes are identical to those of a chimpanzee.
The scale contained an additional item that was not used in the present study since it was improperly translated in some countries.
The textbook knowledge score was defined as the sum of correctly answered textbook items. It ranged from 0 for no correct answers to 6 for all items answered correctly. In the following text, the term 'textbook knowledge' will be referred to as 'knowledge', when the meaning is clear in the given context.
(2) The questionnaire also included three items that targeted image-related beliefs about genes and genetically modified organisms. These were found to be relevant in preceding pilot interviews and focus groups. Although correct textbook answers to the image items exist, they constitute a way of reasoning that is sufficiently separate from textbook knowledge in order to warrant separate treatment: 2(a) Ordinary tomatoes do not contain genes while genetically modified tomatoes do. 2(b) By eating a genetically modified fruit, a person's genes could also become modified. 2(c) Genetically modified animals are always bigger than ordinary ones.
Item 2(a) captures the belief that genes are something artificial and extraneous to natural beings that are brought into living beings only through technological means ('tomato item'); item 2(b) refers to the belief that these genes, once introduced into foodstuff, can infect a person ingesting such food ('contagion' or 'infection item'); and item 2(c) taps the belief that genes introduced into living beings always make them bigger or monstrous ('monster item').
The scale for all items in sets (1) and (2) allowed for 'right', 'wrong' and 'don't know' responses. For all further calculations, a respondent was said to hold an (everyday) image of biotechnology only when he or she jointly agreed to all three items 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c). This criterion underestimates the frequency of image-beliefs and is a stronger and more conservative measure than taking each item separately.
Owing to the wording of the items, we had to consider the problem of assertive response sets, when respondents agreed to all items 1(a) through to 2(c) plus the one not reported item. Assertive response sets were excluded from the data. This also yields more conservative estimates.
Although we are using the term 'image-belief' throughout this study, we want to make clear that, in our opinion, a respondent's agreement to one or more of the image items does not necessarily express a strongly held belief that is propositionally represented in his or her mind. Rather, we think that most respondents agree to an item if they consider it sufficiently plausible, sensible or believable not to resort to 'don't know'. We do not expect that the majority of respondents would spontaneously produce these image-beliefs in an interview and in detail. It is plausibility that allows certain beliefs to be asserted in communication and even more so in a questionnaire.
Finally, the questionnaire included:
(3) A multiple choice question asking 'Over the last three months, have you heard anything about issues involving modern biotechnology?' Response categories were 'No', 'Yes, in newspapers', 'Yes, in magazines', 'Yes, on television', 'Yes, on radio', 'Yes, but don't remember where'. A score of issue awareness was calculated by counting the number of 'Yes' responses, irrespective of the media type.
Survey 1999
This survey employed most, but not all, of the items from the previous questionnaire. The textbook knowledge items 1(a) to 1(f), with the exception of 1(c), were identical. Item 1(c) read 'It is the father's genes that determine whether a child is a girl'. The items about imaginary beliefs were identical to the 1996 questionnaire. Item (3) was not used in the 1999 survey.
Media analysis
For longitudinal media data, a sample of leading opinion press editions was randomly selected in Austria, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, Sweden and several other countries between 1973 and 1999. Each sampled edition was scanned in its entirety for articles pertaining to biotechnology, genetic engineering and other related issues.
In Austria, the daily and weekly press was also scanned for photographs and other iconic material published in the context of biotechnology between May 1996 and May 1997.
Policy analysis
In several countries, political scientists analysed the history of policy-making with regard to biotechnology control and regulation between 1975 and 1999. The details of these analyses are reported elsewhere (Bauer, Gaskell, & Durant, 2001; Durant, Gaskell & Bauer, 1998) .
In relation to Propositions 1-4 presented earlier, the survey, media and policy data allow us to explore the relationship between media activity and adherence to image-beliefs, their changes over time and the relation of image-beliefs to textbook knowledge.
Results
Policy and media: Setting the stage
Austria 1996
At the beginning of 1996, several biotechnology firms announced plans to release genetically modified crops under normal agricultural conditions. When one company decided to plant genetically modified potatoes without prior authorization, publicity for genetic engineering was suddenly triggered. Until then, only involved minority groups had been interested. For the broader public in Austria, genetic engineering products had appeared remote from supermarket shelves and agriculture. Until 1996, there had been little mass media reporting of biotechnology issues.
In 1996, the level of textbook knowledge pertaining to biological facts such as bacteria and viruses, chromosomes and genes, cloning and the genetic apparatus was still low for the Austrian population. This was in part due to the lengthy neglect of biotechnological research by the media. The low level of textbook knowledge and media attention left Austrians virtually unprepared for the sudden and massive confrontation with genetic engineering.
In early 1996, the media extensively covered the NGO activities which opposed the release of genetically modified crops. This led to somewhat confused government reactions and public resistance (Wagner, Torgersen, Seifert, Grabner, & Lehner, 1998) . As a result, in the November 1996 survey, Austrians exhibited the highest score for having recently heard or read about biotechnology (M =1.23; range over all 15 EU countries: 0.42-1.23) and a low score for textbook knowledge (M =3.06; range over all 15 EU countries: 2.97-4.15).
In general, having recently heard or read about biotechnology is positively related to textbook knowledge: the greater a country's average for the score of having read and heard about the topic, the higher the average level of textbook knowledge. The correlation is significant (r=.74, N=14, p£ .005) when outlying Austria is excluded. When Austria is included, the correlation is not significant (r=.46, N=15, n.s.). No equivalent item 'having heard or read about biotechnology' was available in the 1999 survey.
Greece 1999
The public debate about biotechnology in Greece had a minor peak from 1993 to 1995, but only in late 1997 was there a strong activist movement headed by Greenpeace against field trials of GM maize (Sakelaris & Chatjouli, 2001 ). This led to forceful reactions on the part of the government to stop the resistance movement, which then triggered broad media coverage. During 1998, the Greek government appointed an ethics committee, which was welcomed by scientists and government officials as a step towards regulation of a hitherto unregulated technological field. The Greek Orthodox Church further issued a declaration against xeno-transplantation, and Greek supermarket chains took advantage of the broad publicity by issuing a statement against the selling of GM food in their shops. Although the latter activity received little public attention, importers and international food producers strongly rejected this initiative.
In 1999, negative attitudes on the part of the Greek public and officials peaked, and this resulted in a moratorium against GMO releases. As in other countries, GM food was the main target of NGOs, who strongly argued in favour of strict labelling. During this campaign, the media received lists of unlabelled but supposedly genetically modified products. Resulting from the NGO and media campaigns, the government created a new National Food Authority in order to supervise the protection of consumer and public health.
The schedule and impact of biotechnology-related events in both Austria and Greece strongly resemble each other. In both cases, a largely unprepared public became aware of the new technology through media attention. Figure 1 depicts the relative longitudinal intensity of media reporting in Austria, Greece and the average of Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden. These last three countries have the highest average knowledge levels in Europe and are called, in the following text, high-knowledge countries. Figure 1 shows that media reporting in Austria, Greece and the 'high-knowledge' group of countries increases in different years. Media intensity in the high-knowledge group increases steadily from the end of the 1980s onward. In Austria, it begins to rise sharply in 1996 and in Greece in 1997. Consequently, the Austrian public became highly aware of biotechnology-related controversy at the time of the 1996 survey and the Greek public at the time of the 1999 survey, this being a crucial condition if we expect the public to show any effects of symbolic coping as stated in Proposition 1.
The prevalence of image-beliefs
The majority of Austrians were confronted with safety and risk issues and also technical details which related to genetic engineering in 1996. The average person was not prepared to understand the flood of media reports and had little access to any scientific details regarding genetic manipulation and the potential risks involved. The situation in Greece in 1996 was similar to that in Austria, though less pronounced, since a political debate during the preceding years had for the first time drawn attention to biotechnology's agricultural implications. The slight peak in media intensity between 1993 and 1994 reflects this debate (Marouda-Chatjoulis, Stathopoulou, & Sakellaris, 1998). As a result, in 1996, the Greek public was at the beginning of symbolic coping, which then peaked in 1999.
In the present study, a joint belief in the 'tomato item' 2(a), the 'contagion item' 2(b) and the 'monster item' 2(c) is used to indicate symbolic coping. The following excerpt from a focus group nicely captures the gist of these images: Note that this except is from a focus group in 1999. Similar, though less succinct, statements were also found in interviews and focus groups that ran before the 1996 survey. In the summer of 1996, some interviewees mentioned 'there are these tomatoes or potatoes, which are treated with something like genes', which in the context meant introducing genes into the grown vegetables, 'they make it for these bigger tomatoes, bigger bananas', 'the tomatoes will then be gigantic', etc. The genetic mechanism was also mentioned. In 1997, after the 1996 survey had taken place, several Austrian newspapers published pictures accompanying articles critical to biotechnology that nicely captured these image-beliefs (Fig. 2) .
Across all 15 EU member countries, 29.1% of respondents in 1996 and 32.6% in 1999 believed that natural tomatoes did not possess genes, whereas genetically modified tomatoes did, 22.6% of people in 1996 and 24.6% in 1999 believed that eating genetically modified food was able to infect the human body, and 34.8% in 1996 and 28.5% in 1999 maintained that genetically modified organisms were always bigger than natural organisms. A substantial proportion of the European population found these image-beliefs plausible, though many fewer accepted all three items jointly. The dependent variables in the following analysis are (1) joint acceptance of all three imagebeliefs (acceptance), (2) joint rejection of all three image-beliefs (rejection) and (3) admitting ignorance with regard to all three image-beliefs (don't know).
Even though the images were frequently accepted across Europe, the pattern of acceptance, rejection and don't-know responses was characteristically different across countries. Figure 3 presents a correspondence analysis of a stacked 30 ×3 contingency matrix. The data consist of two contingency matrices, each crosstabulating the 15 European countries by their percentage of acceptance, rejection and don't-know responses. One matrix is derived from the 1996 survey, the other from the 1999 data. As a result, each country appears twice, once in the position taken in 1996 and once in 1999. A shift in the two positions reflects changes between the two years.
2 Figure 3 depicts the main bulk of countries as a cloud stretching between the 'rejection' and the 'don't know' responses in both 1996 and 1999. It clearly shows that Austria is the country closest to the 'acceptance' response in 1996, reflecting its symbolic coping state, and changing its position further towards the main cloud of countries in 1999. Though close, but still further from the 'acceptance' response in 1996 than Austria, Greece is closest in 1999 to this response pattern. Between 1996 and 1999, Austria and Greece moved in opposite directions: in 1996, the Austrian public was in a state of symbolic coping and had somewhat normalized its responses in 1999. The Greek public was beginning to cope in 1996, and this culminated in 1999.
An analysis of correspondence relates the countries to each other by means of a v measure of similarity between their response patterns; that is, the frequency pro le of people ticking 'true', 'false' and 'don't know' (i.e. the rows of a contingency matrix cross-tabulating countries and response categories), and does the same for the response categories, that is, the columns of the contingency matrix. The closer two countries or two categories appear to be in the graph, the more similar are their response patterns. The prevalence of a response in one country relative to another can be read by drawing the vector from a response point through the centroid and the perpendicular projection of a country on to this line. The farther out a projection point of a country on the centroid vector of a response category is relative to another
Proposition 1 suggests that the population in countries with a sudden increase in policy activity and media attention to biotechnology, such as Austria and Greece, should show a higher percentage of acceptance responses of the three image-beliefs. This is illustrated in Figure 3 and analysed in Table 1. The table lists the percentage of  people who find all three image-beliefs plausible, reject all of them, or respond 'don't know' to all of them. The data contrast Greece, Austria and the rest of the European countries for the years 1996 and 1999.
We analysed the table using MANOVA for the three dependent variables accepting, rejecting and giving don't know answers on all three image beliefs by country (Greece vs. Austria vs. all other countries) and by year (1996 vs. 1999) . The main effect for the factor country is significant for all three dependent variables: acceptance (F(2,29507)= 42.74, p£ .001), rejection (F(2,29507)= 142.06, p£ .001), don't know (F(2,29507)= 8.24, p£ .001). The interaction country by year is significant for the first two dependent variables: acceptance (F(2,29507)=4.19, p£ .05), rejection (F(2,29507)= 3.55, p£ .05), but not for don't know responses (F(2,29507)= 2.22, n.s.). The interaction is weak because it only reflects the change of Austrian responses in the first two dependent variables from the years 1996 to 1999.
To further illuminate the differences between countries, contrasts were performed for each year. These are indicated in Table 1 by superscripts. They show that Austria and Greece in 1996 and Greece in 1999 showed a higher proportion of respondents accepting the image beliefs than rejecting them in bulk than the other countries. The non-significance for acceptance responses in 1999 indicates that the Austrian public had somewhat normalized its discourse during the three preceding years. This result corroborates the qualitative interpretation of Fig. 3 and illustrates Proposition 4, according to which a process of normalization will set in after coping.
Image-beliefs and textbook knowledge
Propositions 2, 3 and 4 refer to the comparison of responses in countries that are in a state of symbolic coping with those in the state of pre-and post-coping. In order to investigate these propositions, the pattern of acceptance, rejection, and don't know responses on the three image items (response variables) in Greece and Austria is contrasted with the average responses in the group of three countries that have the highest average level of textbook knowledge (Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden; high-knowledge countries) and with the group of three who have the lowest European average level of textbook knowledge (Ireland, Portugal, Spain; defined as lowknowledge countries). In terms of the theory, and according to the media data presented in Fig. 1 , the group of high-knowledge countries can be taken to be beyond the state of coping (post-coping countries). The group of low-knowledge countries is provisionally expected to be pre-coping, although sufficient media data were not available. Within each country or group of countries, we further dichotomized respondents according to their level of textbook knowledge. This factor is used to show the relationship between responses to the image-related items and the individual level of textbook knowledge. Figure 4 depicts the patterns for 1996 and 1999. The patterns were analysed separately for each year using MANOVA. The dependent variable consisted of the relative frequency of each of the three response variables (acceptance vs. rejection vs. don't know on three images, within-subject factor), by country (Greece vs. Austria vs. high-knowledge group vs. low-knowledge group) and by level of respondents' individual textbook knowledge (low vs. high).
In the 1996 data, there is a significant double interaction response variable by country by level of respondents' knowledge (F(8,14772)=19.462, p£ .001). The same double interaction is also highly significant in the 1999 data (F(8,14721)=22.729, p£ .001). These effects allow running separate contrasts for each of the effects suggested in Propositions 2, 3 and 4.
Proposition 2 suggests that more members of a public in the state of coping should adhere to image-beliefs irrespective of their level of textbook knowledge. This proposition is only partially supported. The graphs show that even within high-knowledge countries, the percentage of people with low and with high knowledge levels accepting the image-beliefs is about the same. Further, in low-knowledge (pre-coping) countries where only limited contact with biotechnology existed, the percentage of more knowledgeable people accepting the image-beliefs is even higher than the percentage of the less knowledgeable public. For many respondents in these countries, a higher level of basic biological knowledge does not attenuate, but in fact increases, the plausibility of image-beliefs. The main effect of the variable individual knowledge level within low-knowledge countries is significant (F(1,5938) =55.67, p£ .001). In all other countries, this main effect is not significant. (1996 vs. 1999) in Austria, Greece, high-knowledge (Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, pooled) and lowknowledge countries (Ireland, Portugal, Spain, pooled). Respondents with acquiescence response patterns were excluded.
Proposition 2, therefore, must be revised such that respondents' knowledge level is not correlated with acceptance of image-beliefs in coping (Greece and Austria) or in post-coping countries. This finding corroborates and extends the rationale put forward in Proposition 2 according to which images and their related beliefs are a realmindependent and separate from school and knowledge under virtually all conditions. Proposition 3 suggests that respondents from countries engaged in symbolic coping as well as from post-coping countries should produce fewer don't know responses with regard to image-related items compared with respondents from pre-coping countries. This is well illustrated in Figure 4 . General levels of don't know responses are lower in Greece, Austria and in high-knowledge countries, compared with lowknowledge countries. A contrast calculated by country (Greece, Austria and highknowledge countries collapsed vs. low-knowledge countries) by year (1996 vs. 1999) by level of respondents' individual knowledge (low vs. high) and with the dependent variable relative frequency of don't-know responses yields a significant effect for country (F(1,16132)= 483.40, p£ .001).
Moreover, the relative frequencies of don't-know responses vary significantly more between levels of respondents' knowledge in low-knowledge countries than in others. A contrast calculated for country (Greece vs. low-knowledge countries) by year (1996 vs. 1999 ) by level of respondents' individual knowledge (low vs. high) and with the dependent variable relative frequency of don't-know responses yields a significant interaction between country and level of respondents' knowledge (F(1,7902)=24.43, p£ .001). The same interaction is also significant when Austria is contrasted with low-knowledge countries (F(1,7904)= 66.62, p£ .001).
This finding is particularly counter-intuitive and is a strong argument in favour of the theory. Greece and Austria have a low average country level of knowledge, comparable with the three low-knowledge countries, and should therefore be expected to show similar don't know response behaviour. Considering that the Greek and Austrian public is engaged in symbolic coping and can therefore attain a subjective confidence in understanding biotechnology in terms of the image-beliefs, the lower level of 'don't know' responses becomes meaningful. To a significant extent, image-beliefs produce confidence in one's understanding, as does scientifically informed knowledge in high-knowledge countries.
Proposition 4 suggests that when time passes after a symbolic coping process, a public's response pattern may normalize, and more people should adopt scientifically informed guesses as to whether the image questions are right or wrong. Austria's response pattern in Fig. 4b seems to capture the beginning of this normalizing process. Relative frequencies for rejecting the image-related items, that is, by giving the scientifically correct guess, are lower in 1996 compared with those in 1999, where they even surpass relative frequencies for acceptance responses. The Austrian response pattern mimics high-knowledge, post-coping countries to a certain degree (Fig. 5) . A contrast calculated for country (Austria vs. high-knowledge countries) by year (1996 vs. 1999) and by response variable (acceptance vs. rejection, repeated measure) does yield a significant double interaction country by year by response variable (F(1,8222)=19.13, p£ .001).
Discussion
The present study reports data that illustrate how groups of people cope symbolically with technologies that are perceived as new and potentially threatening. Under certain historical and political conditions, people are under pressure to come to terms with novel and complex phenomena, such as technology change. In Austria, during 1996, and in Greece, beginning in 1996 and culminating in 1999, the media discourse regarding biotechnology increased rapidly, and topics such as crop release experiments, political regulation and the safety of genetically modified food were publicly debated. Lacking the discursive tools for understanding this technology in scientific terms, the public in both countries was called upon to take positions and express opinions. In order to do this, people needed to find a symbolic way to get a handle on the new phenomenon; that is, the public engaged in a process of symbolic coping. The theory of collective symbolic coping implies four concrete propositions, which were illustrated with the available data.
First, political controversy being spread by the mass media does set agendas and creates public awareness of biotechnology. It was shown that this was the case in Austria 1996 and in Greece 1999. These are the countries where symbolic coping sets in and where a considerable proportion of the public finds the image-related beliefs of the gene-less natural tomato, of the potential of becoming infected by genes and of the monstrosity of genetically modified organisms plausible.
Second, it was shown that imaginary beliefs are relatively independent of pre-existing knowledge regarding biological facts. However, this proposition holds true for both coping and post-coping countries. It is true also for pre-coping countries, where even more people with a greater than average textbook knowledge prefer the image-beliefs, compared with those who are less well educated. Image-beliefs seem to exist in a realm independent from textbook knowledge. Third, it was found that the pattern of 'don't know' responses is essential for characterizing countries in the state of coping. Both coping and post-coping countries have a considerably lower level of don't know responses than pre-coping countries. This finding is in line with the theory's prediction and, together with Proposition 2, it illustrates that image-beliefs compensate for a lack of scientific background knowledge.
Fourth, after the 1996 coping stage, Austria seems to move closer to a post-coping pattern of responses in 1999. Though not very strong, this tendency is probably due to a shift towards a more sober style of NGO and government policy-making and mediareporting regarding biotechnology after the first few years of outright conflict and hype in Austria. This normalizing development is also indicated by the fact that the average level of textbook knowledge in Austria approaches the European average in 1999 (Torgersen et al., 2001 ).
Tomatoes and metaphors
Why is it that the tomato captured the public's imagination in Europe? Tomatoes were certainly not an arbitrary choice, although different icons may be expected in different cultures. In many countries, photographs of innocent tomatoes were used in magazines and newspapers and on television to illustrate articles about novel food. Whatever other images might have circulated at the beginning of intensive press coverage about genetic engineering, these images converged easily on the enigmatic icon of the tomato being manipulated by injecting foreign substances, in this case the 'genes'. This metaphorical closure is justified by the fact that the manipulation of organisms is known from medicine and chemistry. People generally know that foreign substances can be injected into organisms, such as in inoculations, and it is not far-fetched to use this knowledge when trying to understand genetic manipulation. Consequently, genes, in this context, are presented as something foreign to the manipulated organism: Genetically engineered tomatoes should possess them, whereas naturally grown tomatoes do not. The associated belief in infections follows: foreign substances, such as bacteria, are known to pass from one organism to another. Hence, genes might very well do the same. Finally, the belief in the monstrosity of genetically engineered organisms is related as well. 'Frankenstein' is not far from these imaginations and in fact often appears in interviews. Just as tomatoes are good to eat, they are also good to think with. These images capture the 'What is it' and the 'How does it work' part of imagination pertaining to 'genetic engineering'. We know from other studies that people's imagination is actually much richer and also embraces moral aspects as well as other areas of knowledge, which do not concern us here (see .
Photographs as well as a video spot that captured the whole set of the aforementioned images were extensively used in several Austrian newspapers and cinemas (see Fig. 2 ). With the people's initiative against the use of genetic engineering in Austria (Anti-Gentechnik-Volksbegehren ) in the first half of 1997, it was primarily the tabloid press-being partisan for this initiative-that used such photographs and headlines such as 'For a gene-free Austria', and 'Against gene-tomatoes', etc. These headlines resonated with the public's image beliefs that we found in the survey conducted a few months earlier, and also in interviews.
Social representations
The present theory is somewhat related to the social representation approach and overlaps with it to a certain degree. Both theories underline the autonomy of everyday thinking that differs fundamentally from scientific reasoning; they highlight that people apply pre-existing knowledge to understand new phenomena; and they stress the iconic character of everyday knowledge.
In contrast to social representations, the theory of collective symbolic coping does not claim to apply to all novel phenomena, but to relatively well-circumscribed technological innovations, particularly if they are controversial. Because of these limitations, the present theory allows more concrete assumptions about the social processes underlying the elaboration of imaginary understanding than the other, and it includes the role of policy and media discourse, which is somewhat neglected in social representation research. Also, the present concept of images and related beliefs is dynamic in allowing everyday imaginations to be replaced by popularized scientific understanding within a short time. It also allows for a backlash in the sense that menacing imaginations might again supersede popularized scientific accounts, should political controversy re-emerge.
Finally, the theory of collective symbolic coping makes a case in favour of everyday imaginations as being functionally equivalent to scientifically informed knowledge. Both forms of knowledge provide a handle with which to understand new technologies and reduce self-ascribed ignorance. Contrary to social representation theory, though, we maintain that it is not novelty and unfamiliarity per se which motivates people to adopt an interpretation. It is a response to topics and situations where their opinion is being asked for, be it in a conversation, in consuming media or in voting; it is not driven internally but externally.
In modern societies, the interplay of interests in commerce, media, policy-makers and NGOs makes power an important factor in the hunt for the public's imagination, and relatively arbitrary ideas can capture wide sectors of the public in a matter of days or weeks. By stressing these process dynamics instead of stability and representational content, symbolic coping theory complements social representation theory in various respects.
Public understanding of science
The theory of collective symbolic coping also has implications for the public's understanding of science. According to the current deficit model of scientific understanding, the way from scientific innovation to its public understanding goes straight from ignorance to scientific literacy via education and enlightenment. Any (quasi-)scientific account of a person on the street, which does not roughly comply with science, is therefore regarded as superstitious, wrong or, at best, incomplete. However, this model is only adequate in the long run where scientific innovation is being relayed through schools, academic teaching and learning, and sober media reporting. The present research shows that understanding technology passes through an intermediate stage where the public compensate for a lack of scientific literacy by using whatever images and metaphors are at their disposal. People's motivation to consult textbooks as the canonical manifestation of science is at this stage probably very low. The approach of collective symbolic coping presented in this article also acknowledges the local validity and communicative functions of whatever images, beliefs, metaphors or representations people produce and collectively 'validate' in their attempt to understand an increasingly complex world.
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